The Mediterranean policy of Catherine the Great gave rise to a discussion about how extreme her colonial ambitions in the Mediterranean were. This article argues against the theories that 'the Greek idea' was only a political game for Russia, that Russian activity on the Aegean islands was only military, and that the success of the Archipelago expedition (1769- Greek islands became an obstacle to enlarging Russian territory on the Black sea coast, however, they were exchanged, primarily for Crimea.
Peloponnesian Greeks were ready and able to participate in a common anti-Turkish war.
In the 1770s Russian diplomatic agents through the European press, and the Empress herself through her correspondence (especially with Voltaire), tried to present the First Archipelago expedition primarily as an attempt to liberate suppressed co-religionists, who 'belie ed in ancient prophecies that they would be liberated by fair-haired race from the North, that the Marble Emperor who slept below the Golden Gate of Constantinople would rise and restore the Byzantine Empire" 9 .
Since the first centuries of the Rus, the Greek idea seemed to mean much more for Russia then for its European neighbors, with a common faith influencing the political course of Russian rulers. Enlightened Russians (including the empress) celebrated Greece's role in the development of European civilization, but Orthodox Russians also developed an appreciation for the region as a holy land, imbued with over a millennium of Christian history. For them, Greece's "pagan" past was sometimes o ershadowed by its connections with sacred Orthodox places, saints, and monasteries. Mount Athos and Patmos were still important stops in the pilgrimage to Jerusalem from Russia. For example, when the Russo-Turkish war started in 1768, 6 Vassiliy Kluchevskiy saw in this expedition a 'poorly prepared ad enture', whose success was possible only due to the impetuous courage of the more then 40 'Russian monks' li ed on Mount Athos 10 , and dozens of pilgrims from the Russian empire appeared to be in great danger in other Ottoman territories 11 .
The enlightened enthusiasm for the classical world shared by the Russian Empress also influenced political estimations about possible support from co-religionists. The sponsors and the members of the expedition imagined the Greeks, whom they were going to liberate, almost as direct descendents of antique heroes. As such, the Russian military expedition can be also interpreted as a cultural mission to the cradle of an antique civilization that had been trampled by barbarians 12 . This helped to sway the public opinion of enlightened Europeans; from the late seventeenth century the eastern Mediterranean represented to Western intellectuals both the birth of civilisation and its modern decline.
The difference between the Western and Russian points of view, however, was in the origin of the decline of the classical culture in Greece. 
'Archipelago principality' of Catherine II
Another issue of the Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean in 1770s was the colonial ambitions of Catherine II and the conquest of Greek islands.
After they had to leave Peloponnesus, the Russians had nothing else to do but to seek a general battle with the Turkish fleet to prove that the appearance of two Russian squadrons in the Levant was not in vain. Without the overestimated Greek strength, the Russian forces in the Mediterranean were weak and poorly equipped, which is why the resulting victory of Chesme (June 24-25, 1770) was miraculous (and so it was described in Russian poetry 19 In the Archipelago, however, nobody had any information about Catherine II's intentions. The deputies from fourteen islands swore an oath to become 'subjects of the Russian Empress'
and 'to fulfill her injunctions' and 'to lose the barbarian yoke fore er'. These deputies, however, responded that by paying taxes they needed assurance that they would be protected by the Russian fleet from 'all enemies', and they asked the Russians to confirm social structure of each island ('to separate superiors from lowers') and not to demand more taxes 'than the isle is able to pay'. For their part, the inhabitants of islands were to show 'respect and to be obedient' to their deputies, were forbidden to move from one island to another without passports from the deputies, and had to show the deputies all correspondence 26 .
On Paros, deputies from the Russian islands elected a general deputy, Anton Archipelago chancellery was opened on Paros. In March 1771, this 'deputy of the subjects of the Archipelago islands' was sent out on a military ship with a reliable guard 'to pro e to the Greeks that as they became Our Great Empress' subjects, we protect them and defend them from enemies" 27 . Letters sent by Psaro to the islanders (some of them are still preserved in archives of the islands 28 ) show that his duties were wideranging: he collected taxes; controlled the businesses making dried bread for the Russian fleet; set up regular elections of syndics, etc. By June, 1771 he had already placed his brother Peter Psaro in the chancellery for help.
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One part of the Greek clergy, the bishops of Athens, Peloponnesus, and 'the Russian' islands chose to accept not only the Russian military administration but also the Russian Synod which was a sign of their complete separation from the Ottoman Empire.
Everything seemed to be organized for a long-term administration of the islands. On the isle of Naxos, Alexey Orlov (possibly following Catherine II's advice) demonstrated the enlightened perspectives of the Russian presence and opened the first civil school at a time when
Greeks only had parish schools and few theological academies. Orphans and children from families of various economic backgrounds were sent to Naxos, with all their expenses paid by
Orlov. "The Greeks boys who were in the Naxos school, including the children of primates, as well as orphans and children of poor islanders, were supplied by me with clothing, food, and education, in accordance with the magnanimity and generosity of our All-Merciful sovereign...who, like a Mother, tends to the upbringing of these poor families..." 30 . The children were educated by the "teachers assigned to them... in the basics of Christian law and grammar,"
as well as the Russian language ("so that they would be taught Russian grammar, and became able to read and write"). Spirido also thought it necessary to teach the boys "na igation", as "46 young Greeks from Naxos" were temporarily sent out "as cabin boys to arious ships." 31 The
Greek Giovanni Azzali, a native of Patra was the director and the bursar of the school 32 .
The school children lived in isolation from their families and were probably supposed to constitute "a new breed of people" for a new Greek state, who would also be grateful and loyal to the Russian Empire. The purpose of the school was articulated as follows: "the intention of his generosity of our All-merciful Sovereign-the nurturer of orphans and protector of peoples that share our faith, who took part in this war and grew wretched because they lost their homes and their fatherland." 33 Staring in July 1773, Orlov, wanting to give his school experiment a bigger resonance, transferred the students to Pisa, where he acquired a house specifically for his school.
There, he took on Ekaterina Marin (the widow of Greek volunteer George Marin) as a warden of the school; her children were educated there as well, at the expense of the Russian treasury.
Orlo wrote to Spirido : "I ask you not to abandon the Greek children, who are recruited already and will be recruited in the future, and who, in groups of about 15, should be sent to me here [in Pisa] by ships when the opportunity arises. I am establishing a school for them here, and acquired a big house in Pisa for this purpose; I do not know what the court will order to do with them in the future, but I think that there is a house prepared for them there as well, where they will be admitted for arious kinds of learning."
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The school was filled not only with Aegean children but with students from the Ionic islands, possibly refugees from the Peloponnese. On the island of Zante (Zakynthos) there were possibly over 300 boys and girls ready to be enrolled. In a letter sent July 2, 1773 to Count
Mocenigo, who represented Russian interests in the Adriatic, Spiridov wrote that boys between fourteen and twenty years of age should be sent with passing ships to Naxos at the expense of the Russian treasury, but that both boys and girls could also be sent directly to Livorno, so that, after quarantine, they could enroll in the school founded by Count Orlov 35 . In the following years, 1774-1775, Orlov continued to look after the school, instructing Elmano to send, "with pro isions," "all boys to Italy for education and upbringing in the school established for them in Pisa" (with the pro iso that this should only be done with their parents' permission, "without any coercion.") 36 . When the fleet left the Mediterranean, the Greek students were taken from Pisa to Russia 37 . In January 1775, a special school for the Greeks boys from the Archipelago was established in St. Petersburg, which was transformed in 1792 into the "Corps of Foreign
Coreligionists."
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The first modern reliable descriptions of the Greek Archipelago appeared in 1770s-1780s
as the 'Archipelago principality', written by the Russian naval officer Kokovtsov and a Dutch volunteer Pasch van Krienen, both of whom had actually visited the places they described 39 . Nestero 's documents 44 prove, that this state consisted of units (each island was a unit); every year each unit had to elect its head, 'main members of the whole island' or 'island deputies'. (As there are no precise comments of norms and rules of elections it is highly possible that these elections were organized according old traditions of each island.) Deputies-under Russian rule just as it had been previously-conjoined the functions of ruling and judging, and they gathered to settle 'state and public affairs' in a chancellery of an each island.
In their legal practice deputies were ordered to follow mainly their own laws and only in uncertain cases to ask the central chancellery. It was clear that in legal practices the Russian commandment did not intend to change anything, but to arrange the civil administration 'properly' 45 . Deputies could also gather a home guard to make arrests or to protect the island 40 Ibid. Imperial holidays and receiving instruction from Russian officers on how to improve both the self-governing administration of every island and of the island federation as a whole. Crucially, the Russians considered these islands not to be conquered, but to be liberated from the Ottoman yoke, placing 'our Greeks' in opposition to those who continued to be subjects of the Porte. hotels in Naussa bay. In the 1770s, the Ausa base and its fortifications (with up to 5 000 soldiers and sailors) was compared in the Western press with Kronshtadt-the main Russian naval base on the Baltic sea 50 .
In the end, the Russians in the eastern Mediterranean rarely acted like colonialists or conquerors. Without any experience in creating an overseas colony, with no special economic interests in eastern Mediterranean, but with an ambition to play a role in the Mediterranean 'concert of powers', Russia could desire no more than a system of patronage o er a federation of selfgoverned islands that might surround and protect a small Russian military base in the eastern
Mediterranean. 
Western volunteers and les avanturiers of the Archipelago expedition.
It is 'under the wise go ernment of the Russian Empress, are in a happy condition' 51 . There is no doubt that the Archipelago Expedition exemplifies the popularity of adventurism in the eighteenth century, and no presentations in the political theatre of this time were played without these intrigues. Yet it is also evident that the majority of the achievements of this period could not have taken place without this spirit of adventurism, and that it that must be treated seriously.
Conclusion
After the end of the war in June 1775, the Russian fleet left the Archipelago but never exited the Mediterranean, instead it used different bases and excuses for staying in the region. In the time of Catherine the Great, various tools (sermons, celebrations, monumental propaganda, etc.) were used to shape the historical memory of the First Archipelago Expedition. Russia had its own historical mythology: that the expedition was purportedly organised only to 'help coreligious Greeks and Sla s', and that Catherine II in this way had realised the plan of Peter I. The most successful proclamation of these ideas came from the famous Metropolitan Platon, whom St.Petersburg, I am sure that Counts Orlov will replace in Greece the Miltiades and the Themistocles".
To support this theme, Catherine the Great herself planned to erect a number of monuments to commemorate the Russian presence in the Archipelago. In fact, she continued to play her games with the Aegean islands even after she had to have known that the Mediterranean possessions had become too expensive a plaything.
It seemed that many of the illusions should have been dashed-the Greeks were far from being "Spartans holding Orthodox Crosses," and their liberation appeared remote. Even more illusory was the taking of Constantonople. However, in St. Petersburg the discourse continued. 
